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INTRODUCTION
Preference agreements, also called ﬁrst refusal agreements, are agreements in
which one party promises to prefer the other party when concluding a
speciﬁc type of contract (‘the main contract’). Such an arrangement may also
be created by will, where a testator provides that a beneﬁciary may not sell
the inherited object without giving another a chance to buy it ﬁrst,1 or by
legislation.2
Preference agreements are widely used in a number of different contexts.
Lease contracts often contain a clause providing that if the lessor should
decide to sell the leased premises, the tenant will ﬁrst be given the
opportunity to buy the premises, before it may be sold to an outsider.3 This
type of right of ﬁrst refusal is also called a ‘right of pre-emption’, a
preferential right to buy the property concerned before all others.4 Similar
clauses granting a preferential opportunity to contract are often found, inter
alia, in company statutes, partnership contracts, mineral contracts, supply and
distribution contracts, franchise agreements, publishing, music recording and
* BA LLD (Stell). This article is partly based on research undertaken for my doctoral dissertation, The
Legal Nature of Preference Contracts, University of Stellenbosch (2003). I beneﬁted from ﬁnancial assistance by
the National Research Foundation, the Harry Crossley Fund and the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdi-
enst and from comments and suggestions by my promoter, Gerhard Lubbe, and Jacques du Plessis. I also
beneﬁted from a discussion of certain issues with Philip Sutherland and Izelle du Plessis. Any remaining
errors are, of course, my own. Reinhard Zimmermann kindly hosted me at Regensburg University where
part of this research was done.
1 Van Wyk v Posemann 1915 CPD 672; Fick v Fourie 1934 EDL 152; Engelbrecht v Mundell’s Trustee 1934
CPD 111; Ex parte Zunckel 1937 NPD 295; Bodasing v Christie NO 1961 (3) SA 553 (A).
2 See section 10 of the Share Titles Act 95 of 1986 and sections 10A and 10B of the Housing Act 107 of
1997.
3 See, for example, Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA 310 (A); Krauze v Van
Wyk 1986 (1) SA 158 (A) and Hirschowitz v Moolman 1985 (3) SA 729 (A).
4 I use the word ‘property’ to refer to all kinds of things susceptible to private ownership, including
incorporeal things. ‘Rights of pre-emption’ include preferential rights to purchase at a ﬁxed price or at a
price at which the grantor is prepared to sell. Some English writers limit the term ‘right of pre-emption’ to
preferential rights to purchase at a ﬁxed price, however (see Quentin Smye ‘Pre-empting the problems’ 28
April 2003 Property Law Journal 10).
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software development contracts, patent licensing agreements and employ-
ment contracts.5
Despite the widespread use of preference agreements, the residual rules on
the basic rights, duties and remedies of parties thereto are surrounded by
controversy in South African law.6 I have argued before that where the
preference contract predetermines the eventual contract price, for example
by providing for a speciﬁc price or a price to be ﬁxed by a third party, any
manifestation of a desire to conclude the main contract, such as negotiations
with a third party, should amount to breach. It should also entitle the holder
of the right to bring the main contract into existence at that predetermined
price, since the grantor, having agreed to the price, has no interest in
sounding out the market for a higher price once the decision to contract is
taken.7 On the other hand, where the preference contract does not
predetermine the price, or simply refers to the price which the grantor
would accept from a third party, the default rule should be that nothing short
of a valid offer to, or contract with, a third party amounts to breach by the
grantor.8 The grantor should be left as free as possible to sound out the
market and obtain the best possible price for his property without fear of his
conduct breaching or triggering the holder’s right.9 I have also previously
considered the question whether the holder of a right of ﬁrst refusal falling
within this second, ordinary class of preference contracts may ultimately
enforce performance of the main contract on breach, or whether the holder
should instead be limited to damages and remedies aimed at preserving or
restoring the status quo ante breach.10 I have argued in this regard that the
opposing policy considerations in favour of each of these approaches can
most fairly be balanced by a rule that the holder should be entitled to enforce
performance of the main contract, but only upon the grantor having
breached the contract by contracting with a third party or making an offer to
a third party.11
Another aspect, which requires closer scrutiny, concerns the delineation
of the transactions that breach or ‘trigger’ the holder’s right and therefore
give the holder the right to exercise his right of ﬁrst refusal and to enforce the
main contract. The Appellate Division has held in Associated South African
Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd12 that the holder is
5 For details and examples see Tjakie Naudé The Legal Nature of Preference Contracts unpublished LLD
dissertation, University of Stellenbosch (2003)1–5.
6 For details see Naudé op cit note 5 paras 1.1 and 1.2; Tjakie Naudé ‘The rights and remedies of the
holder of a right of ﬁrst refusal or preferential right to contract’ (2004) 121 SALJ 636; Tjakie Naudé ‘Rights
of ﬁrst refusal or preferential rights to contract: a historical perspective on a controversial legal ﬁgure’ (2004)
15 Stell LR 66; M F B Reinecke & J M Otto ‘Voorkope en ander voorkeurkontrakte’ 1986 TSAR 18 at 21;
T B Floyd ‘Die Voorkoopsreg’ (1986) 49 THRHR 253; Schalk Van der Merwe, L F Van Huyssteen, M F B
Reinecke, G F Lubbe & J G Lotz Contract: General Principles 2 ed (2003) 79–81.
7 Naudé (2004) 121 SALJ op cit note 6.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 1982 (3) SA 893 (A).
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entitled to ‘step into the shoes of the third party’ upon conclusion of a
contract in breach of the holder’s right.13 This raises the question whether
the holder must be able to perform all the terms of the third party contract,
before the shoes can be said to ﬁt. For example, a right of pre-emption is
obviously triggered or breached by a sale of a property to a third party, but
there are third party contracts with unique features which may cause
uncertainty as to whether they trigger the right of pre-emption at all, and if
so, on what terms the holder may enforce performance of the main contract.
Questions arising in this context include the following:
1. Which types of transactions are covered by a pre-emption agreement?
Would an involuntary sale, such as a sale by the trustee of the grantor’s
insolvent estate, trigger the right of pre-emption, for example? What
about a sale at a nominal price to a company in which the grantor is the
only shareholder and which the grantor regards as his alter ego? Or the
transfer of the pre-emption property to a partnership in which the
grantor is a partner?
2. If the transaction proposed to be concluded with the third party does
amount to the type of transaction which the holder has the preferential
right to enter into, what is the effect of the third party undertaking to
render some unique performance which the holder cannot match?
3. What is the effect of a sale of the pre-emption property as part of a larger
package of properties (the so-called ‘package deal’ situation)? Does such
a sale trigger or breach the right of pre-emption? If so, must the holder
be prepared to buy the entire package in order to exercise her right of
pre-emption, because she must step into the shoes of the third party?
Does she in any event have a right to buy the entire package, or only the
pre-emption property, and if the latter, how is the price calculated? Or
would a proposed package deal merely entitle the holder to an interdict
prohibiting the grantor from selling until he receives a third party offer
for the pre-emption property alone, which the holder can match?
4. What is the position when the grantor intends to sell only a portion of
the pre-emption property? The holder may have little use for anything
less than the entire property, and may not be interested in buying only a
portion. On the other hand, non-exercise of her right at that stage may
cause the grantor to sell the entire pre-emption property to the third
party in increments, in which case the holder would wish to retain her
preferential right. Does the failure of the holder to exercise her right
when a portion is proposed to be sold to a third party deprive the holder
of the right to buy the property when it later appears that the whole
property was eventually sold?14
13 907F.
14 Other questions which are not addressed in this contribution relate to the effect of a voidable contract
with a third party, a conditional contract, a third party contract subject to the grantor’s right to cancel it
should the holder exercise her right of ﬁrst refusal. On these questions, see, Harm Peter Westermann in
Wolfgang Krüger & Harm Peter Westermann (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Band
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The South African case law on these questions is still developing and does
not always provide clear answers. Most of these questions have also not been
addressed by South African writers. Drafters of preference agreements also
rarely provide for these types of situations. Preference agreements are usually
worded very cryptically and often do not provide clear answers to these
important practical questions.
I will deal with each of the four questions identiﬁed above in turn by
considering relevant SouthAfrican case law in the light of the position in the
USA and Germany, two countries where preference agreements have
received much more attention. The German Civil Code (BGB15) regulates
one type of right of pre-emption, namely the Vorkaufsrecht.16 The
Vorkaufsrecht does not prohibit a sale to a third party until the holder has had
a chance to buy the property ﬁrst. Instead, the BGB provisions on the
Vorkaufsrecht envisage that the grantor must ﬁrst contract with a third party,
after which the holder can be required to decide whether to exercise her
right.17 The type of right of pre-emption generally encountered in South
Africa, which forbids the grantor from contracting with a third party ﬁrst, is
termed a Vorhand in Germany. This type of right of pre-emption is not
regulated by the BGB and probably for that reason more rarely encountered
than Vorkaufsrechte.18 Although there is therefore a difference between
rights of pre-emption as normally understood in South African law and
Vorkaufsrechte, they have some aspects in common, such as that the holder
should ultimately be entitled to enforce performance of the main contract
after the grantor contracts with a third party. It might therefore be useful to
consider the rules on the types of transactions which trigger a Vorkaufsrecht
and the effect of unique, personal terms in the third party contract.
Whereas the primary aim of this contribution is to make proposals on the
appropriate default regime in each of the situations mentioned above, I also
seek to draw attention to the uncertainty surrounding some of these
questions with a view to encouraging drafters of preference agreements to
consider the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of initiating negotiations
on these matters and of drafting accordingly.
3 Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil I §§ 433–610, Finanzierungsleasing, HeizkostenV, BetriebskostenV, CISG 4 ed
(2004) § 463 Rn 15–16.
15 The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
16 §§ 463–73 BGB. For more on the Vorkaufsrecht see Naudé op cit note 5 at 79–91 and the various
German commentaries on this part of the BGB, such as Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note
14 at §§ 463–473; Florian Faust in Heinz Georg Bamberger & Herbert Roth Bamberger Kommentar zum
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Band 1 1 ed (2003) §§ 463–73; Hans Putzo in Peter Bassenge et al (eds) Palandt
Gesetz zurModernisierung des Schuldrechts — Ergänzungsband zu Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 61 ed (2002)
§§ 463–73.
17 § 463 BGB.
18 On the Vorhand generally, see Naudé op cit note 5 at 91–118 and authorities there cited.
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WHICH TYPES OF CONTRACT TRIGGER A RIGHT OF PRE-
EMPTION?
Determining the types of transaction that trigger a right of ﬁrst refusal is
primarily a matter of interpreting the contract. Many preference agreements
do not, however, clearly spell out the intention of the parties in this respect
and residual rules are therefore valuable. Transactions involving pre-emption
property raise the following questions:
1. Does an involuntary sale, such as a sale in execution or by the grantor’s
trustee in insolvency, trigger the right of pre-emption? What about a
distribution in kind upon dissolution of a non-corporate structure such
as a partnership?
2. What is the effect of a non-arm’s length transfer to a relative or
commercially related party? Would a sale by a grantor to a company
wholly owned by him breach the right of pre-emption, for example?
What happens when the pre-emption property is transferred between
two corporations controlled by the same person? Is the sale of the shares
of a corporate grantor tantamount to a sale of the pre-emption
property? Is a transfer of the pre-emption property to a partnership in
which the grantor is a partner, a trigger event? May the grantor transfer
his interest in the pre-emption property to his co-owners without this
triggering the right of pre-emption?
3. Is a right of pre-emption only triggered by a ‘sale’ or also by the grant of
a 99-year lease, a testamentary disposition, donation or exchange
contract, or the transfer of pre-emption property to the grantor’s
ex-spouse as part of a divorce settlement? What about a contract in
which the third party undertakes to pay an amount of money for the
pre-emption property and additionally perform a service?
Involuntary sales
There are conﬂicting South African decisions on the question whether an
involuntary sale, such as a sale in execution, triggers a right of pre-emption.
Van Wyk v Posemann19 holds that the pre-emption property must be
offered for sale to the pre-emption holders ﬁrst when a sale in execution is
imminent, or at any rate, before the property is ﬁnally sold to a third party.20
The court in Van der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation21 took a slightly
different approach, but one which nevertheless protects the holder’s right of
pre-emption upon a sale in execution. It held that when the deputy sheriff
sold shares in a private company at a sale in execution, the parties must have
intended that the deputy sheriff sell to the respondent the rights which the
19 1915 CPD 672.
20 At 674. The clause in the will read that ‘none of [the legatees] shall have the right to sell his or her share
in the said far to a stranger; but that they shall be bound to sell their shares mutually to each other’. Cf also
The Trustees of the Estate of AAJ Jonker v The Executor Dative of Adolf Jonker Deceased 1 R 334.
21 1991 (4) SA 78 (Tk).
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judgment debtors possessed vis-à-vis the transfer of the shares.22 The
respondent therefore purchased the right to notify the directors that the
judgment debtor wished to transfer the shares into its name. If the remaining
members exercised their right of pre-emption, the respondent would be
entitled to receive payment from them for the shares.23 The effect is that the
sale in execution therefore triggered the holders’ right of pre-emption,
although it was not the sheriff who had to offer the shares to the other
shareholders ﬁrst. The fact that the sale was involuntary and that article 21 of
the company’s articles of association indicated that the right of pre-emption
would arise upon the shareholder ‘desiring to sell’ his shares, therefore made
no difference in the court’s view.
By contrast, in Bodasing v Christie NO,24 a will provided that if a legatee
‘wants to sell’ the property left to him, he must do so to another legatee at a
ﬁxed price. The court interpreted this clause as restraining only a voluntary
sale to anybody but the holder of the right of pre-emption. Accordingly, the
trustee of the legatee’s insolvent estate could freely sell the property without
regard to the right of pre-emption.
American cases also diverge on this issue. Most courts have held that an
involuntary sale does not trigger the right of pre-emption as it is usually made
dependent upon the grantor ‘desiring to sell’, which implies a voluntary
act.25 However, a few courts have held that the holder of a right of
pre-emption has a prior right to buy the property at a sale in execution.26
Another view is that, whereas an involuntary sale gives the holder of the
right of pre-emption no greater rights than any other buyer at that sale, the
purchaser at such a sale takes the property subject to the right of
pre-emption.27
The German Civil Code provides that the Vorkaufsrecht does not apply to
a sale in execution or a sale upon insolvency or liquidation of the grantor.28
This provision is peremptory and is aimed at protecting the grantor’s
creditors.29
Absent contrary agreement, a sale in execution or upon the insolvency or
liquidation of the grantor should indeed not be regarded as breach of the
right of pre-emption or a trigger event, as it is not a contract concluded by
the grantor. The policy consideration that restraints on alienation should be
strictly construed also points to this conclusion. Where the right of
pre-emption predetermines the price at which the holder may buy the
22 At 81F–G.
23 Ibid.
24 1961 (3) SA 553 (A) 561A–B.
25 Ryan M Tew ‘Rights of ﬁrst refusal: the ‘options’ that are not options, but may become options’
(1989) 10 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Proceedings 7–1 at 7–67 and cases there cited.
26 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–67. In Richfield Oil Corp v Security-First National Bank 323 P 2d 834 (Cal App
1958) the court held that the deceased grantor’s executor who intended to sell the pre-emption property
had to offer it to the holder ﬁrst.
27 Draper v Gochman 400 SW 2d 545 (Tex 1966).
28 § 471 BGB.
29 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 471 Rn 2; Faust in Bamberger & Roth op
cit note 16 at § 471 Rn 2; Putzo in Bassenge et al op cit note 16 at § 471 Rn 4.
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property upon the grantor desiring to sell, it would also be against the public
interest for the right of pre-emption to apply to involuntary sales as well. It is
in the public interest, such as in the interest of the grantor’s creditors, that the
sheriff, trustee or liquidator obtains the highest possible sum at the forced
sale, and potential buyers may lose interest if they learn that the holder may
exercise her right to buy at a ﬁxed sum regardless of what they offer for the
property.
Nevertheless, as the holder often has legitimate reasons for wishing to
exercise his right upon a sale in execution or upon insolvency, the parties
should be free to extend the right of pre-emption over involuntary sales. In
the usual situation, where the preference agreement does not predetermine
the ultimate purchase price, this would not necessarily reduce the chances of
obtaining a good price at such a sale in the interest of the grantor’s creditors.
Accordingly, their interest does not justify a peremptory prohibition on the
right of pre-emption extending to involuntary sales (contrary to the position
in Germany).30 It is true that a right of pre-emption often dampens third
party interest in the pre-emption property, as a third party may not want to
invest time and money in negotiating a sale only to have the property
snatched away by the pre-emption holder thereafter. Sales in execution do
not, however, as a rule involve as much pre-contractual costs and effort for
the third party as voluntary sales, as the sheriff usually determines the
conditions of sale unilaterally. A normal right of pre-emption which does not
predetermine a price is therefore not very likely to dampen third party
interest in the forced sale: the third party may still hope with good reason that
the holder will not be willing and able to match the highest bid at the
auction.
Drafters of rights of pre-emption should therefore take instructions on
whether the right of pre-emption should apply to involuntary sales and other
transfers by operation of law (such as a transfer to an ex-spouse in terms of a
divorce order, or a transfer to the grantor’s intestate heirs) and draft
accordingly. In view of the importance of rights of pre-emption for private
companies (or ‘limited interest companies’), especially ‘closely held private
companies’whose shareholders have good reasons for wishing to control the
identity of their co-shareholders,31 the legislator should preferably indicate in
Table B of the Companies Act that the right of pre-emption applies to
involuntary sales as well in the manner foreseen by Van der Berg v Transkei
Development Corporation.32 However, it should be against public policy for a
right of pre-emption to buy at a ﬁxed sum to extend to involuntary sales.
30 This matter was in fact controversial before promulgation of the BGB (Benno Mugdan Die Gesamten
Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich Band II (1979) Motive II.350 at 194).
31 See further Carrie A Platt ‘The right of ﬁrst refusal in involuntary sales and transfers by operation of
law’ (1996) 48 Baylor LR 1197.
32 Supra note 21.
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Non-arm’s-length transactions between commercially related parties or relatives
Questions which arise in this context include the following: would a sale by a
grantor to a company wholly owned by him breach the right of
pre-emption? What is the effect of a transfer of the pre-emption property
between two corporations controlled by the same person(s)? What about the
distribution of corporate assets to the shareholders of the company? May the
grantor transfer his undivided interest in the pre-emption property to his
co-owners without this triggering the holder’s right of pre-emption over this
interest? Is a transfer of the pre-emption property to a partnership in which
the grantor is a partner, a trigger event? A related question is whether the sale
of the shares of a corporate grantor is tantamount to a sale of the pre-emption
property. A sale below market value to a relative, for example to the grantor’s
son, raises similar questions.
Once again, none of these questions has been clearly decided by the South
African case law. Two cases concern a sale of the pre-emption property
(shares in both cases) to a company controlled by the grantor or by the
grantor’s parent company.
In Bellairs v Hodnett33 Bellairs sold his shares in Northcliff Townships (Pty)
Ltd to Picked Properties (Pty) Ltd, without ﬁrst having offered the shares to
his co-shareholder, Hodnett.34 The court stated that Bellairs ‘bona fide
regarded [Picked Properties] as being his alter ego, created merely as a
receptacle of his various interests’35 (in his township companies). This
explained why he sold his shares to Picked Properties at virtually their cost
price which bore no relation to their true value.36 When Picked Properties
thereafter proposed to sell the shares to a third party, Bellairs accepted that
Picked Properties was bound by Hodnett’s right of pre-emption and ﬁrst
offered to sell the shares to Hodnett, an offer which he accepted. He claimed
damages from Bellairs for an alleged breach of his right of pre-emption
which occurred upon the initial sale to Picked Properties, alleging that he
was entitled to buy the shares at the very low price paid by Picked Properties.
The court assumed without deciding that the sale by Bellairs to Picked
Properties did breach the right of pre-emption, so that damages was payable,
and that the only question concerned the correct measure of damages.37 The
words ‘the price which he is willing to accept for such shares’ which
appeared in the pre-emption provision was held to mean the price which the
member, by the exercise of his own free volition, ﬁxes as being the amount
he wants the other member(s) to pay him for his shares.38 The court accepted
that it was utterly inconceivable that Bellairs would have accepted the cost
33 1978 (1) SA 1109 (C).
34 A shareholders’ agreement between the parties provided that ‘a member desirous of selling his shares’
would give notice containing an offer to the secretary of the company who would then send an invitation to
offer to buy at those terms to the other shareholders in the company.
35 At 1136D.
36 At 1136C.
37 At 1137F–G.
38 At 1139B.
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price of the shares from the other member, namely Hodnett, as he knew that
the shares were worth far more at the time.39 Rather, the only safe
conclusion was that Bellairs would have offered them to Hodnett at their
true value, so that Hodnett suffered no damages
The court therefore did not rule out the possibility that a sale by the
grantor to a company which he regards as his alter ego might not be breach,
as it did not decide this point. It nevertheless treated a sale to a company in
which the grantor was at that stage the sole shareholder as being different to a
sale to any other party.
In Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd40 less sympathy was shown to
a grantor company that sold to its wholly owned subsidiary at a very low
price. The court allowed the pre-emption holder to buy on the same terms,
and rejected the arguments that the pre-emption agreement envisaged an
arm’s-length price or that the sale to the subsidiary was not a ‘disposal’ as the
grantor retained control over the pre-emption property.41 The court stated
that the veil of corporate personality would not easily be pierced,42 and
suggested that this would normally only be done where the transaction
concerned could be regarded as a ‘cloak, or a ﬁction or a sham’,43 which was
not the case on the facts. The sale to the subsidiary was regarded as a genuine
contract, designed to vest the South African assets of an external company in
its wholly-owned local subsidiary. Although the purchase price was low, the
court held that it was based on a genuine valuation by an engineer, which did
not anticipate the subsequent increase in value.
By contrast, American courts usually treat a conveyance between
closely-related parties that does not amount to an arm’s-length transaction as
not constituting a trigger event.44 Transactions which fall into this category
include sales between afﬁliated corporations,45 contributions of property,
whether for value or not, from a natural person to a corporation owned by
the natural person46 and distribution of corporate assets to the corporation’s
shareholders.47 Some cases also concern sales from one partner, co-tenant or
39 At 1140B–C.
40 1985 (4) SA 615 (T).
41 The preference agreement granted ‘(a) The right of ﬁrst refusal for a period of 30 days, by it or its
nominee, to acquire the rights to precious metals, including platinum, in respect of the farm, together with
the metals found in the ores of precious metals, in the event of your company deciding at any time to take
the initiative in disposing of such precious metal rights; (b) the right, for a period of 30 consecutive days
from the date that your company advises us of the receipt of a bona ﬁde offer from a third party to match
such offer, either direct or through its nominee, to purchase all rights to precious metals as aforesaid.’
42 624F.
43 625H.
44 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–66 – 7–67 and cases there cited as well as further cases cited in footnotes 45–49
below.
45 See, for example, Creque v Texaco Antilles Ltd 490 F 3rd 150 (Virgin Islands CA2005), Sand v London &
Co 121 A 2d 559 (1956).
46 See, for example, Kroehnke v Zimmerman 467 P 2d 265 (Colo 1970), McGuire v Lowery 2 P 3d 527 (Wyo
2000) and Belliveau v O’Coin 557 A 2d 75 (R I 1989) which concerned sales by the individual owners to
their wholly-owned corporation.
47 In Lehn’s Court Management LLC v My Mouna Inc, Chicken George’s Palance Inc and Moussa 837A 2d 504
(Pa 2003) a transfer for value from the grantor corporation to the sole shareholder of such corporation was
also held not to trigger the right of pre-emption.
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co-owner to another48 and intra-family conveyances.49 The exclusion of this
type of transaction from the ambit of triggering transactions is often justiﬁed
with reference to the typical wording of preference provisions, according to
which the buyer may purchase on the terms contained in a ‘bona ﬁde offer to
purchase’,50 and by the normal deﬁnition of a right of ﬁrst refusal as a right
granting an option to purchase on the terms contained in a ‘bona ﬁde offer’
by a ‘third party’ to purchase the property.51 The cases concerned typically
rely on the absence of a change in control of the pre-emption property in the
case of a transfer to a corporation controlled by the same interests, or a
transfer to the grantor’s sole shareholder, where the motive of the transfer is
business convenience.52 The courts accordingly look ‘beyond formalities and
accounting entries to the true nature of the conveyance’,53 and, if it amounts
to a restructuring rather than a sale, they treat it as such.54 In this regard, a sale
has been deﬁned as ‘a transfer (a) for value (b) of a signiﬁcant interest in the
subject property (c) to a stranger [to the contract creating the right of
pre-emption] (d) who thereby gains substantial control over the [pre-
emption] property’.55 Obviously, if a non-arm’s length transaction does not
trigger the right of pre-emption, the courts accept that the ‘new owner’
remains bound by the right of pre-emption.56
Although loss of control is seen as signiﬁcant in the cases discussed above,
the loss of control over the pre-emption property entailed by the sale of all
the shares of a corporate grantor has not caused courts to regard such sale as a
trigger event.57 In this regard, the holder of the right of pre-emption has not
been allowed to ‘pierce the corporate veil’,58 even in instances where the
third party had originally inquired about buying the pre-emption property
and/or had bought the shares at the same price it had originally offered to
48 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–66. See also Pellandini v Valadao 113 CalApp 4th 1315 (2003). The fact that no
new owner is introduced is seen as decisive. See Prince v Elm Inv Co Inc 649 P 2d 820 (Utah 1982) at 822.
Robert Flannigan ‘The legal construction of rights of ﬁrst refusal’ (March-June 1997) 76 Canadian Bar
Review 1 at 22 notes that a transfer of an undivided share to a co-owner does trigger a right of pre-emption
in Canada, however.
49 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–66. See, for example, Isaacson v First Security Bank of Utah 511 P 2d 269 (1973),
where a ‘sale’ from father to son for one-third of the market value was held to be ‘more of a gift than a sale’
which did not trigger the right of ﬁrst refusal (at 272).
50 See, for example, Creque v Texaco Antilles Ltd supra note 45.
51 See, for example, Creque v Texaco Antilles Ltd supra note 45 at 152.
52 Creque v Texaco Antilles Ltd supra note 45 at 154; Lehn’s Court Management LLC v My Mouna Inc supra
note 47; McGuire v Lowery supra note 46; Sand v London & Co 121 A 2d 559 (1956) 562. Prince v Elm Inv Co
Inc supra note 48 at 821 did hold that a transfer of property from a sole owner to a partnership in which the
owner was one of two partners invoked the right of ﬁrst refusal, on the basis that there had been a change in
control of the property because management decisions had to be made unanimously by the partners and not
by the erstwhile owner alone. In Belliveau v O’Coin supra note 46 the court reasoned that there was no
substantial transfer of control to an unrelated third party (78–9).
53 Creque v Texaco Antilles Ltd supra note 45 at 154.
54 Ibid.
55 Prince v Elm Investment Co Inc supra note 48 at 823, afﬁrmed in Lehn’s Court Management LLC v My
Mouna Inc supra note 47 at 510–11.
56 See, for example, Creque v Texaco Antilles Ltd supra note 45 at 153; Belliveau v O’Coin supra note 46.
57 LaRose Market Inc v Sylvan Center Inc 530 NW 2d 505 (Mich 1995). Canadian law is the same on this
point (Flannigan op cit note 48 at 21, who regards this as unfair where the pre-emption property is the most
important asset).
58 LaRose Market Inc v Sylvan Center Inc supra note 57.
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buy the pre-emption property.59 This situation has been distinguished from
those mentioned above on the ground that equitable considerations such as
the parties’ motives for the sale and the relationship between the parties are
not relevant to a mere corporate stock transfer, as the identity of the
corporate grantor/owner does not change.60 Another justiﬁcation has been
that rights of ﬁrst refusal must be interpreted narrowly.61 It has also been said
that ‘[i]n view of the ready severability and alienability of corporate stock —
and indeed the inevitability of a turnover in the stockholders of a corporation
of perpetual duration — it would in most cases be unrealistic and unfair not
to consider the lessor [grantor] to be the corporation itself, not its
stockholders’.62 However, if the sale of the shares in the corporate grantor is
part of a pre-arranged plan to sell the shares to the outsider ﬁrst and thereafter
to transfer the property of the corporation to its shareholders, proof of bad
faith or wrongdoing would cause this ‘multistep transaction’ to trigger the
right of ﬁrst refusal.63
Certain non-arm’s length transactions between related parties are also
disregarded as non-triggering events in German law. Thus, a co-owner is not
treated as a ‘third party’, and therefore a transfer against value to a co-owner
does not trigger another’s right of pre-emption.64 This rule is comparable to
the American rule that transfers amongst partners are not trigger events.65
One German court stated obiter that if only one undivided share in the
common property was subject to a right of pre-emption, a sale of that share
to another co-owner would indeed trigger the right of pre-emption, as the
buyer did not have any right to the undivided share in question and was
therefore a ‘third party’.66 This suggestion, which is supported by the
German writer Schurig,67 was not taken up by the German Supreme Court
in a later case, however,68 perhaps because of the particular facts of that case.
The co-owner in question granted a right of pre-emption over his share to
an entity which was economically speaking identical to itself upon
disagreement arising between the co-owners. The holder of the right of
pre-emption purported to exercise its right when the property was thereafter
awarded and ‘sold’ to the other co-owner upon dissolution of the
co-ownership. The court argued that a co-owner is not a ‘third party’ for
purposes of a right of pre-emption, so that no trigger event occurred. In
59 KCS Ltd v East Main Street Land Development Corp 388 A 2d 181 (1978); Cruising World Inc v
Westermeyer 351 So 2d 371 (Fla 1977) at 372.
60 LaRose Market Inc v Sylvan Center Inc supra note 57 at 509.
61 Ibid.
62 Prince v Elm Investment Co Inc supra note 48 at 823.
63 Ibid; LaRose Market Inc v Sylvan Center Inc supra note 57 at 508–9 and the cases cited there.
64 BGHZ 13, 133; BGH WM 1957, 1162; Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 16 at § 463 Rn 24;
Othmar Jauernig (ed) Jauernig Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Kommentar 11 ed (2004) § 463 Rn 17; cf Barbara
Grunewald ‘Umgehungen schuldrechtlicher Vorkaufsrechte’ in Hermann Lange et al (eds) Festschrift für
Joachim Gernhuber (1993) 137 at 146–7 for criticism of this view.
65 See note 48 above.
66 BGHZ 13, 133.
67 Klaus Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht im Privatrecht (1975) 163–4.
68 BGHZ 48, 1.
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addition, it argued that to allow the exercise of the right of pre-emption
under these circumstances would mean that the termination of the
co-ownership would become practically impossible as the other co-owners
would never be allowed to become sole owner through making the highest
offer for the property. Schurig criticizes the court’s refusal to regard
co-owners as ‘third parties’ in this context.69 He argues that the co-owner is
indeed a third party as he was not a party to the pre-emption agreement.
Furthermore, according to Schurig, there are other provisions in the BGB
which prevent a deliberate evasion of the rules on dissolution of
co-ownership, namely, where the co-owner intentionally creates a right of
pre-emption in order to retain control over a share of the property.70 He
argues that if the grant of the right of pre-emption was not aimed at such
evasion, the holder should be able to exercise his right over an undivided
share of the pre-emption property when that share is sold to a co-owner.
It has also been suggested that a sale of shares to another shareholder in the
same company may sometimes trigger the other shareholders’ right of
pre-emption, namely, where it is clear that the purpose of the right of
pre-emption is not merely to ward off unwanted third parties, but was
granted by reason of the holder’s interest in obtaining more shares in the
company.71
German law is similar to American law in another respect: a transfer of the
pre-emption property to a company as a contribution by its shareholder is
generally not regarded as a ‘sale’ which triggers a right of pre-emption,
insofar as the transfer is not aimed at evasion of the right of pre-emption.72 A
transfer of land from one company to another in the same group against an
issue of shares has been held to amount to a company restructuring, which
did not trigger a right of pre-emption over the land.73 It has also been argued
that any sale which is merely aimed at a restructuring within a group of
companies should not be regarded as a trigger event.74 This would include a
sale of the pre-emption property by the parent company to a subsidiary or
69 Schurig op cit note 67 at 165 ff.
70 Schurig op cit note 67 at 167–8.
71 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 463 Rn 24.
72 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 16 at § 463 Rn 22; Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op
cit note 14 at §463 Rn 19. Schurig op cit note 67 at 136 accepts this view where the parties intend that that
speciﬁc asset must be contributed to the company, for example where the company will conduct its business
from the property involved, as the grantor cannot achieve his purpose through selling the property to the
holder. Schurig argues, however, that where the grantor is concerned merely with contributing value to the
company, regardless of the form of such contribution, the holder should be able to exercise his right of
pre-emption to buy the property involved. In that case, he argues, the grantor’s purpose can be achieved
through a sale to the holder: the grantor can contribute the proceeds of such sale to the company. He points
out that the onus would be on the holder to prove that a transaction falls within the last-mentioned
category. His view is not generally accepted by other commentators on the BGB (Bamberger & Roth op cit
note 16 at § 463 Rn 22; Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 16 at § 463 Rn 19)
73 OLG Stuttgart BB 2001, 794 as cited by Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 163
Rn 19.
74 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 16 at § 463 Rn 24; Ulrich Huber in Hans-Joachin Mertens
(ed) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen Kohlhammer-Kommentar begründet von Hs
Th Soergel & W Siebert 3: Schuldrecht II (§§ 433–515) AGB-Gesetz, AbzG, EAG, EKG, UN-KaufAbk 12 ed
(1991) § 504 Rn 15a. Cf Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 463 Rn 24.
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vice versa or a sale between subsidiary companies or a sale by a company to
another company controlled by exactly the same persons.75 Others argue that
the situations in which such cases can be regarded as ‘a sale to a third party’
are, in fact, problematic and unclear.76 It appears, however, that intra-group
transfers are sometimes expressly excluded from the ambit of triggering
transactions,77 which seems advisable given the uncertainty in this area.
As under American law, a sale of the shares of the grantor company does
not in Germany trigger a right of pre-emption over that company’s property
in the absence of contrary agreement.78
Sales to relatives are sometimes expressly excluded from the ambit of
trigger events. The German Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of
such agreement, a sale at a reduced price between a father and son did trigger
a right of pre-emption.79 It was decided that it was irrelevant to the exercise
of the right of pre-emption whether the transaction could be described as a
sale or mixed donation. Insofar as it was a mixed donation, the advantage of
the lower price to the son could simply not beneﬁt the pre-emption holder.
This implies that, insofar as the pre-emption agreement did not provide for a
price in such a situation, the holder should be able to exercise his right at a
price determined in accordance with §§ 315 and further of the BGB
(basically, on the basis of a fair price determined by the grantor).80 German
law therefore differs from American law on this point. However, it has been
argued that the mixed donation should not trigger a right of pre-emption,
where the price is clearly below market value to the knowledge of the
parties.81 Schurig advocates a purposive approach to this problem: he argues
that if the bequest to the relative or friend is the main purpose of the contract,
this purpose cannot be attained by the holder exercising his right and so the
contract should not trigger the right of pre-emption. However, he agrees
with the Supreme Court’s solution where the purpose of beneﬁting the
relative or friend by the lower price is merely an ancillary purpose, in which
case § 466 BGB should apply which prescribes that the holder should pay the
value of an ancillary performance undertaken by the third party. This
argument stretches the meaning of § 466 too far, however. It should be noted
that § 470 BGB speciﬁcally excludes sales to statutory heirs where the sale is
concluded out of consideration for the heir’s future right to inherit.
75 Huber in Mertens op cit note 74 at § 504 Rn 15a.
76 Christoph Hahn ‘Rechtsgeschäftliche Vorkaufsrechte im Rahmen von Grundstückskaufvertragen’
1997 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 193 at 199.
77 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 463 Rn 23; Götz Hueck ‘Erwerbsvorrechte
im Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Gotthard Paulus et al (eds) Festschrift für Karl Larenz (1973) 749 at 761.
78 Hahn op cit note 76 at 197.
79 NJW 87, 390, 392; Grunewald op cit note 64 at 138–9.
80 The court based its decision on ‘ergänzenden Vertragsauslegung’ (literally, supplementary interpreta-
tion of the contract) based on what the parties to the pre-emption agreement would have agreed in
accordance with good faith, taking account market norms or customs (‘Verkehrssitte’). The implication is
that the grantor’s assertion that he only intends to transfer to his relative, should not be taken into account,
exactly because he granted the right of pre-emption.
81 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 16 at § 463 Rn 22.
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Whereas there is some uncertainty in German law, a comparative study of
South African, German and American law therefore reveals that transactions
between related parties are more likely to be disregarded as trigger events in
Germany and America, whereas the only South African court which
speciﬁcally considered whether an intra-group sale triggers a right of ﬁrst
refusal refused to regard the sale as a mere restructuring which did not trigger
the right.
One argument in favour of retaining the South African approach is that it
is strictly speaking consistent with the reluctance to ‘pierce the corporate
veil’ evident from our case law, which only allows such piercing in the case of
fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use of the
company.82 It also effectively prevents deliberate evasions of the right of ﬁrst
refusal by the grantor. The American rules seem fairer, however, and it is
more consistent with the intention of the parties that only contracts with true
outsiders should trigger rights of ﬁrst refusal, as they alone cause a change in
control over the pre-emption property. There also appears to be a growing
recognition in South Africa that intra-group transfers should not simply be
equated with transfers between non-related parties. For example, s 45 of the
Income Tax Act83 provides that, where an intra-group transaction as deﬁned
in the Act takes place, the two parties are deemed to be one for certain
purposes. The holder of the right of pre-emption would to some extent be
protected against a deliberate evasion of his right in the form of a transfer to
another company or relative by a rule that the right of ﬁrst refusal survives
such a non-arm’s length transfer so that the new owner is bound thereby. In
addition, a ‘step transaction’ deliberately aimed at evading the right of ﬁrst
refusal should allow the holder to exercise his right, as American law
recognizes. This would be the case, for example, where the grantor ﬁrst sells
the property to a company wholly owned by him, and thereafter sells all the
shares in that company to an outsider, who soon after causes the company to
be liquidated and the pre-emption property ‘distributed’ to him as
shareholder.
It is in any event advisable that grantors speciﬁcally consider providing for
sales to certain persons, such as relatives, companies controlled by the grantor
or other companies in the same group.
Other transactions that are not sales
There are other non-arm’s length transactions or alienations which in all
three systems considered here are generally held not to trigger a right of ﬁrst
refusal. These include testamentary dispositions, intestate succession and
donations. Bona ﬁde exchanges are usually also not regarded as ‘sales’ for the
purposes of a right of pre-emption.
82 See, for example, The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) at
566E.
83 Act 58 of 1962.
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Thus in Crous NO v Utilitas Belville84 a testamentary disposition of
pre-emption property was not regarded as a trigger event, even though the
pre-emption agreement required an offer before an ‘alienation’ of the
property, and did not use the word ‘sale’ in this regard. The court held that
‘alienate’ (‘vervreem’) bears its ordinary meaning of a voluntary and
‘intentional’ transfer of ownership of property by an owner to a new owner.
The position is the same in American law85 as well as in German law, where
even a sale to a statutory heir in view of the heir’s later right to inherit, is not
regarded as a trigger event.86
Voet’s view that a right of pre-emption does not prevent the owner from
disposing of the subject-matter by way of gift, testamentary disposition or
bona ﬁde exchange, has also been cited with approval in South African case
law,87 and agrees with German law88 and the majority of American decisions
on this point.89 Pre-emption contracts are therefore not understood as
granting the holder a right to contract, which the grantor may not thwart by
agreeing to donate or exchange the property, but rather as mere undertakings
that the holder would be preferred above others if the grantor should sell.90
These decisions are consistent with the general principle that pre-emption
contracts should be strictly construed. That the grantor is under no
obligation to ensure that the holder is able to ‘exercise his right’ in the sense
of obtaining the property, appears from the fact that the grantor may alter,
damage or destroy the object as he pleases as long as it has not been sold to a
third party.91
A transaction which combines an exchange of property with monetary
consideration should be approached in the normal manner under South
African law: the parties’ intention is the primary consideration when
classifying such a contract, but where their intention is unclear, the
transaction would be a sale where the monetary component exceeds the
value of the property exchanged for it.92 Consistent with this principle,
mixed exchanges should be regarded as sales where there is some indication
84 1994 (3) SA 720 (C).
85 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–66–7-67; Marr v Hebert 415 So 2d 254 (LaApp 1982) (in which the preference
agreement speciﬁcally bound the grantor ‘and his heirs’, which clearly excludes a testamentary disposition
to the heirs as a trigger event).
86 § 470 BGB.
87 Voet 18 3 10, cited with approval in Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921AD 168 at
188 and Edwards (Waaikraal) Gold Mining Co Ltd v Mamogale NO & Bakwena Mines Ltd 1927 TPD 288 at
295. See also Grotius 3 16 14.
88 RGZ 101, 101; BGHZ 49, 8; BGH WM 57, 1164; Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note
14 at § 463 Rn 18.
89 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–65 – 7–66. An example of a recent case is Park Station Ltd Partnership, LLP v
Bosse 835 A 2d 646 (Md 2003).
90 Naudé op cit note 5 at 341–2.
91 Ibid.
92 Wastie v Security Motors 1972 (2) SA 129 (C). Where the third party undertakes to transfer a unique
object with great sentimental value for the grantor along with monetary compensation, which the third
party is only prepared to do against transfer of the object of the right, the parties’ intention would be to
conclude a contract of exchange, as the sentimental value which the grantor attaches to the property is
worth even more to her than the monetary component.
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that non-monetary consideration was added simply to evade the right of
pre-emption (as is the position under German law).93
The same principles should apply where the consideration consists partly
of a service to be rendered. If the intention of the parties is unclear, one
should therefore consider whether the preponderant part of the third party’s
obligations consists in the supply of goods or services to establish whether the
transaction could be classiﬁed as a sale which triggers the right of
pre-emption.94
There is no South African case law which considers whether a transfer
between ex-spouses as part of a divorce settlement triggers a pre-emption
agreement. However, it is submitted that such a transfer, whether in return
for monetary compensation or not, should not be regarded as a trigger event,
but that the transferee should remain bound by the right of pre-emption.
Drafters of pre-emption agreements should consider providing for
99-year leases as well, as these would likely not be regarded as ‘sales’ which
trigger a right of pre-emption. In Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange &
Fox95 a ‘lease in perpetuo’ was indeed regarded as breach of a right of
pre-emption, but the effect of a 99-year lease has apparently not been
considered in our law. In one American decision, the court held that an
eighty-four year lease did not activate a right of pre-emption.96
TRANSACTIONS THAT INVOLVE UNIQUE TERMS WHICH
THE HOLDER CANNOT MATCH
If application of the above principles shows that the third party contract is of
the type which would normally trigger a right of ﬁrst refusal, the question
remains whether the holder’s inability to perform a subsidiary obligation
personal to the third party disqualiﬁes her from exercising her right. An
example would be an undertaking by a third party buyer, a close relative, to
allow the grantor to stay on in the pre-emption property and to nurse the
grantor in addition to paying the purchase price, which the relative is only
prepared to do against transfer of the object of the right of pre-emption.97
The grantor may show that he would not consider being nursed by anyone
else in other surroundings. In the case of a right of ﬁrst refusal to conclude a
new lease at the end of a lease contract, the grantor may argue that the holder
is unable to use the premises for the same purpose undertaken by the third
party and therefore cannot exercise his right. This would be the situation, for
example, where the holder has operated a book shop on the premises,
whereas the third party contract states that the lessee may only conduct a gift
shop.
93 See the authorities in note 88 above.
94 Naudé op cit note 5 at 342; cf Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 (1) SA195
(RA).
95 1891 4 SAR 116.
96 Kings Antique Corp v Varsity Prop 503 NYS 2d 575 (NY 1986).
97 RGZ 121, 139.
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Conceivably, application of the rules mentioned so far may provide an
answer for some such cases. For example, if the obligation to provide services
or to transfer unique property for which money would be no substitute, is
the only, or most important, reason why the grantor decided to alienate, one
could argue that the preponderant part of the third party’s obligation
comprises the supply of services or property, so that the parties did not intend
to conclude a sale. The holder is not prejudiced as he can only reasonably
expect to be preferred above third parties in respect of sales. Perhaps it can
even be argued that he can only reasonably expect to be preferred above
third parties who would provide the same consideration as him in respect of
the type of contract foreseen by the preference contract.A counter-argument
that the grantor created reasonable reliance on the part of the holder that
only a higher monetary consideration would let him prefer a third party
above the holder, is also worthy of consideration. On the other hand, if that
argument should serve to prevent the grantor from relying on personal
obligations in the third party contract, consistency would require that all
exchange contracts should also be regarded as a breach of the preference
contract. As there is something to be said for the contrary view, there is no
good reason to depart from the existing rule that the grantor is free to
conclude an exchange contract with a third party.
South African law
SouthAfrican case law on the effect of unique terms which the holder cannot
match reveals conﬂicting views and some unpersuasive results.
A case which did not follow a strict duty-to-match approach is Dithaba
Platinum v Erconovaal.98 As noted above, the ‘third party’ contract in this case
was concluded with a subsidiary of the grantor, incorporated for the purpose
of acquiring all the grantor company’s assets and liabilities in South Africa.
The court held that such transfer of the assets was a sale which triggered the
right of pre-emption, even though the contract made special provision for
payment in the form of ordinary shares in the subsidiary equal to the net
book value of the assets and liabilities taken over. The court held that the
pre-emption holder could exercise his right to buy the pre-emption property
at the book value placed on it on the basis that ‘[i]f the grantor of the rights
chooses to accept satisfaction of money in a form which is impossible for the
grantee to match, he cannot complain if the grantee offers him the cash for
which he stipulated in the bargain’. As argued before, the transaction
involved should rather be regarded as a non-arm’s length transfer in the form
of a company restructuring which should not trigger the right of pre-
emption at all, and it should therefore not carry much weight in the present
context.
Swart J of the Transvaal Provincial Division in the unreported case of
98 Supra note 40.
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Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter99 took a stricter approach by apparently
requiring an exact duplicate of the third party offer. The case concerned the
Golden Lions Rugby Union’s right of ﬁrst refusal to conclude a new
employment contract with Venter, a rugby player, after expiry of his ﬁxed
term contract. The court implicitly held that the exercise of the right of ﬁrst
refusal was precluded by the inclusion of unique terms in an employment
contract subsequently concluded between Venter and the Natal Rugby
Union. The court held that the Golden Lions Rugby Union could not
match the terms offered by the Natal Rugby Union in respect of the living,
training and working environment of the player. In this regard, the court
held that an exercise programme which includes training on the beach and
swimming in the sea could not be matched by the Golden Lions Rugby
Union and that the latter Union could not supply coaching by the same
coaches employed by the third party club.
Another case which reﬂects a strict matching approach is Soteriou v Retco
Poyntons (Pty) Ltd.100 The majority stated obiter that, to use the Oryx
mechanism,101 the holder must be able to ‘step into the shoes of the third
party’, and suggested that this applies even in respect of the use to which the
leased premises may be put.102 This is apparently consistent with the
reference in the Oryx case to Glück’s statement that the holder must be
willing to perform all the terms undertaken by the third party,103 although
this was not relevant to the facts of Oryx. The minority in Souteriou took a
different approach — the holder must declare unequivocally and unquali-
ﬁedly that he intended to step into the shoes of the third party on the terms
and conditions of that lease, ‘in so far as they were not inconsistent with his
continued use of the premises as before.’104
American law
There are diverging American cases on the effect of third-party contracts
which are of the type foreseen by the preference agreement, but which
99 Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter (unreported) Transvaal Provincial Division Case 2007/2000
decided on 11 February 2000. This case is discussed by M W Prinsloo ‘Enkele opmerkings oor
spelerskontrakte in professionele spansport’ 2000 TSAR 229 at 242–3 and M M Loubser ‘Sport and
competition law’ in J AA Basson & M M Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Service Issue 2 (August
2001) at 8–39 ff.
100 1985 (2) SA 922 (A).
101 That is, the remedy recognized in Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte
Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA893 (A) in terms of which the holder can create a contract on the same terms
as agreed with the third party by unilateral declaration.
102 935B-C. After referring to the Oryx mechanism, the court stated that: ‘There would seem to be no
reason in principle why the same should not apply where a lessee of premises has a right of ﬁrst refusal of a
new lease. But the lease concluded with the third party must be such that the grantee of the right can step
into the third party’s shoes. It is not clear that he could do so in the present case. The terms of Poynton’s
contract with CNA have not been disclosed, so that important provisions are unknown, including the
duration of that lease, and the use to which the premises may be put.’ Because the terms of the third-party
contract were unknown, the court merely ordered that the lessee may not be ejected as he had undertaken
to fulﬁl the terms of the third party contract (935B–E).
103 906H. See also Floyd op cit note 6 at 266. This aspect of Oryx is also what swayed the court in Golden
Lions Rugby Union v Venter supra note 99 to insist upon exact matching of the third party’s offer, even as far as
the living conditions of the employee is concerned.
104 937H.
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contain terms that are impossible to match.105 It is a settled principle that
defeat of a right of ﬁrst refusal should not be allowed by the use of special,
peculiar terms not made in good faith.106 An indication that terms were not
imposed in good faith is the absence of a reasonable basis for distinguishing
between the two offers.107 Thus it is often said that the grantor may impose
any conditions that are commercially reasonable, imposed in good faith and
not speciﬁcally designed to defeat pre-emptive rights. Apart from that
exception and modiﬁcations necessitated by the different identity of the
parties, some courts require that the holder’s offer must be a perfect match.108
Other courts have, however, allowed the exercise of the right of ﬁrst
refusal where the differences between the two proposed contracts are not
substantial.109 Some courts have worded this to require only matching of the
essential or material terms of the third party’s offer.110 It has also been said
that, as long as the holder submits an equally desirable offer, it does not need
to submit an identical offer.111 It has also been held that because the holder is
stepping into the third party contract the court must consider commercial
realities and allow modiﬁcations consistent with the intention of the parties
to the preference agreement,112 a principle which takes into account the
reasonable expectations of the preference holder.113
One reason for this opposition to a strict matching requirement is the ease
with which a grantor could otherwise evade the right of ﬁrst refusal by
105 See generally Tew op cit note 25 at 7–80 – 7–81.
106 See, for example, Prince v Elm Investment Co Inc supra note 48 at 825; Brownies Creek Collieries Inc v Asher
Coal Mining Co 417 SW 2d 249 (Ky 1967) at 252; Davis v Iofredo 713 NE 2d 26 (Ohio 1998); Sessel Holdings
Inc v Fleming Companies Inc 949 F Supp 572 (Tenn 1996); West Texas Transmission LP v Enron Corporation 907
F 2d 1554 (5th Cir 1990).
107 West Texas Transmission LP v Enron Corporation supra note 106. In Prince v Elm Investment Co Inc supra
note 48 at 825 the court required the grantor/seller to justify the unique features of the third party contract
according to ascertainable commercial standards given that it was a commercial contract. The court also
gave the example of a third party offer which includes a house which the seller intends to use as a personal
residence. In this regard, it said, the seller’s personal preference might be eminently reasonable. But if the
seller intended to use the house as a rental property, an explanation in commercial terms is probably
required to meet the reasonableness standard.
108 See, for example, Minar v Skoog 50 NW 2d 300 (Minn 1951); Sessel Holdings Inc v Fleming Companies
Inc supra note 106; Tew op cit note 25 at 7–80–7-81. An example of the modiﬁcations necessitated by the
different identities of the parties would be a change of the choice of law provision to reﬂect the fact that
both grantor and holder reside in the same state, whereas the third party contract chose the law of the third
party’s state. Some decisions go further by not requiring commercial justiﬁcation for the unique term. See,
for example, Hall CJ, in the minority in Prince v Elm Investment Co Inc supra note 48, who stated that the
grantor’s decision to accept the holder as a partner in property development in the place of the third party
buyer remains a personal one upon which the court cannot impose an objective standard.
109 See, for example, Prince v Elm Investment Co supra note 48; Davis v Iofredo supra note 106; Brownies
Creek Collieries Inc v Asher Coal Mining Co supra note 106; Vincent v Doebert 539 NE 2d 856 (Ill App 1989).
See also Tew op cit note 25 at 7–80.
110 Hallmark Builders Inc v Hickory Lakes of Brandon Inc 444 So 2d 1047 (Fa 1984); Davis v Iofredo supra note
106. In the latter case, the holder was not required to match the third party’s undertaking to use a certain
corporation to do remedial work to the property as such term was non-material and peculiar.
111 Davis v Iofredo supra note 106 at 28.
112 Arden Group Inc v Burke 45 Cal App 4th 1409 (Cal App 1996) at 1414. The court allowed tenants to
exercise their right of pre-emption where the only differences between the two offers were those made
necessary by the fact that the tenants intended to continue to use the property as before as a gas station,
whereas the third party purchasers proposed to remove the gas station and clean up the property. For a
discussion of the case, see ‘Leases: Right of ﬁrst refusal properly exercised’ January 1998 Real Estate Law
Report 5.
113 C Robert Nattress & Associates v CIDCO 184 Cal App 3d 55 (Cal App 1986) at 72.
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including unique or peculiar terms. That the holder need only submit an
equally desirable offer and not an identical offer is said to be ‘axiomatic’.114
The fact that strict matching may sometimes thwart the holder’s reasonable
expectations as to the circumstances under which she would have been able
to exercise her right is also relevant.115
On the other hand, requiring an unqualiﬁed acceptance is said to
guarantee the grantor that he will receive the beneﬁt of the bargain under
which he agreed to relinquish his interests,116 so that the terms of the
contract involved remains his exclusive prerogative, as long as he acts in good
faith.117 However, a number of the cases which require strict matching could
also have been decided on the basis that the modiﬁcation in question was
clearly substantial, so that it was not necessary to lay down a principle of strict
duplication.118
German law
The German Civil Code provides in § 466 that if the third party has
undertaken a subsidiary obligation119 which the pre-emption holder cannot
perform, the holder may pay the value of such performance (being the value
at the time of exercise of the right).120 If the subsidiary obligation cannot be
valued in money, exercise of the right is precluded, unless the holder can
prove that the third party contract would also have been concluded without
such subsidiary obligation.121
The object of this provision is to ensure that the grantor is not worse off
when contracting with the holder instead of the third party.122 The provision
ensures that the grantor is free to decide on the terms of the sale, although he
may lose the beneﬁt of certain less important subsidiary obligations.123 At the
same time, § 466 BGB aims to prevent evasion of the right of pre-
emption.124
114 Davis v Iofredo supra note 106 at 28.
115 Cf C Robert Nattress & Associates v CIDCO supra note 113 at 72.
116 West Texas Transmission LP v Enron Corporation supra note 106 at 1565.
117 Weber Meadow-View Corp v Wilde 575 P 2d 1053 (Utah 1978).
118 See, for example, Sessel Holdings Inc v Fleming Companies Inc supra note 106 (in which the holder
attempted to modify a provision of the third party agreement stating that shares acquired were solely for the
purchaser’s own investment and not for resale or distribution); West Texas Transmission LP v Enron
Corporation supra note 106 (in which the court held that the holder’s attempt to exercise its right without
accepting a requirement of FTC approval in the third party contract would substantially vary the terms of
the third party contract (1565)). In addition, Minar v Skoog supra note 108, which also required strict
duplication, was clearly wrongly decided. The court incorrectly held that the holder did not validly accept
‘the terms of the option offer’. A proper analysis of the facts reveals that the grantor did not make any offer
because the holder was never informed of the terms of the third party contract; thus there was no offer to
accept. The grantor should not be allowed to sell to a third party until the terms of its offer has ﬁrst been put
before the holder (see further Naudé op cit note 5 at 357–60; Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137 at 145).
119 Nebenleistung.
120 § 466(1) BGB. See also Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 4.
121 § 466(2) BGB. It would be difﬁcult for the holder to prove that the contract would have been
concluded without the obligation in question. See Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn
5.
122 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 3.
123 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 466 Rn 1.
124 Ibid.
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If the obligation which the holder cannot perform is a principal
obligation,125 § 466 BGB does not apply, but the contract will then not be
regarded as a sale, so that the right of pre-emption is not triggered.126
It is also said that § 466 BGB does not apply where the subsidiary
performance by the third party is not undertaken in exchange for the
pre-emption property, so that the grantor has no interest therein.127 In this
case, the term involved does not bind the pre-emption holder due to a
different section of the BGB, namely § 464(2). Such terms are regarded as
‘alien elements’ (‘Fremdkörper’) which are not part of the contract of sale.128
An example would be an undertaking by the third-party buyer to pay the
costs of making projections129 where he himself instructed the company that
undertook to make the projections and the company also had no connection
with the grantor.130 An example of a term aimed at evasion of the right of
pre-emption which would also not bind the buyer is a penalty clause which
applies on resale of the pre-emption property, when the penalty clause was
not necessary for the grantor’s decision to conclude the contract.131
An example of a subsidiary obligation that is regulated by § 466 is an
undertaking by the buyer of a restaurant to buy its beers from the seller, a
brewery.132 An example of a subsidiary obligation that cannot be valued in
money is an undertaking by the third party to nurse the grantor, his uncle,
when the grantor is not interested in being nursed by an outsider.133
Evaluation
The South African decisions which require strict matching are problematic.
If one presupposes that the right of ﬁrst refusal considered in Golden Lions
Rugby Union v Venter134 was an enforceable restraint of trade,135 the result
125 It appears that essential terms are in view here as opposed to what South African lawyers would
understand as incidentalia.
126 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 1.
127 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 6; cf, however, Westermann in Krüger &
Westermann op cit note 14 at § 466 Rn 2.
128 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 1; § 464 Rn 6; Westermann in Krüger &
Westermann op cit note 14 at § 466 Rn 1; § 463 Rn 20.
129 Projektierungskosten.
130 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 464 Rn 6.
131 Westermann in Krüger &Westermann op cit note 14 at § 463 Rn 20, with reference to OLG Stuttgart
OLGR 2001, 145.
132 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 2; cf BGHZ 102, 237, 242.
133 RGZ 121, 137, 140; Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 15 at § 466 Rn 5; Westermann in Krüger
& Westermann op cit note 14 at § 466 Rn 2.
134 Supra note 99.
135 Loubser argues that such an agreement should normally be regarded as an unreasonable and
unenforceable restraint of trade which unduly restricts an employee’s freedom to work where he pleases (op
cit note 99 at 8–39, 8–40, 8–45; cf Prinsloo op cit note 99 at 242–3). A full consideration of this issue is
beyond the scope of this article. See further Naudé op cit note 5 at 345–6. Brieﬂy, Loubser is correct in
stating that the general principles applicable to the enforceability of restraints of trade should be considered.
However, the right of ﬁrst refusal does not ‘prevent a sport professional from freely offering his services’. As
long as he does not contract with another club before the holder had a chance to match that other club’s
offer, he is free to negotiate with other clubs. It is true that other clubs’ interest in negotiating with the
player may be dampened by the right of ﬁrst refusal. This would prejudice the player’s freedom to trade.
However, in the case of a valued or talented player, this is unlikely to be an obstacle to a third party club’s
interest, as is clear from the Venter case. The employer’s interest is not the only factor to be considered in
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reached seems unacceptable. To allow an argument that the holder, an inland
rugby club, cannot exercise its right as it cannot offer a lifestyle close to the
beach as the rival third party club can do, would mean that the preference
contract is a dead letter. In addition, the sportsman created a reasonable
reliance that the better ﬁnancial content of the third party offer and other
terms integral to his working conditions were all that would sway him not to
contract with the holder. Certainly he created a reasonable reliance that the
mere fact that another club is situated in a different area would not have an
effect on his decision whether to contract with the holder or the third party.
As each club is situated in a different area with unique advantages, the
preferential right would never otherwise bind the sportsman, as he could
always point to some unique advantage of relocating which has nothing to
do with the advantages integral to the employment contract itself, such as the
monetary compensation, housing offered and undertakings on the promi-
nence to be given to the player (for example, that he would play at least 3 out
of every 4 matches or would be the ﬁrst choice player in his position).136
Countless opportunities to evade the right would therefore be opened if such
aspects are considered.137 Such a result could not have been intended, as the
parties clearly foresaw a binding contract. Similar non-material extraneous
beneﬁts of contracting with another club should rather play a role when the
reasonableness and enforceability of the right of ﬁrst refusal as a restraint of
trade is considered, or if it passes that test, when the court exercises its
discretion to award speciﬁc performance or damages. The unreported
judgment of Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter cannot be supported,
therefore, insofar as it found that the holder of the right of ﬁrst refusal,
Golden Lions Rugby Union, could not exercise its right as it did not match
the third party club’s offer.138
The minority view in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons139 which only requires the
tenant (with a right of ﬁrst refusal to conclude a new lease) to match terms
which are consistent with his continued use as before also seems fairer than
the majority view. The latter view effectively allows the grantor to defeat the
holder’s right very easily, as chances are that interested third parties intend
running a different business from the premises than the holder. The grantor
should at least be required to prove a reasonable justiﬁcation for inserting a
term that the premises could only be used for a particular purpose whereas he
evaluating a restraint of trade. The effect on the player’s freedom is also crucial. In this regard, a right of ﬁrst
refusal is less onerous than a normal restraint of trade which prohibits an employee from working for a
competitor.
136 For example, the undertaking by the Natal Rugby Union that Venter would be the ﬁrst choice no 8
player for Natal (page 13 of the judgment) is an integral and material part of the third party’s offer relating to
the working conditions themselves which should be matched by Golden Lions to exercise its right of ﬁrst
refusal.
137 Cf Barbara Grunewald in Harm-Peter Westermann (ed) Erman: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 10 ed (2000)
§ 504 Rn 8 (now § 463).
138 Cf Prinsloo op cit note 99 at 243 who questions the correctness of the court’s decision that exercise by
the sea and the opportunity to work with the coaches employed by Natal are of material importance in
contracts with rugby players.
139 Supra note 100.
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was previously content with the purpose for which it was used by the lessee.
He arguably created a reasonable reliance that the holder’s right of ﬁrst refusal
would not be thwarted merely because he would want to continue to use the
premises as before.
A similar argument could be raised against an author who argues that the
atmosphere at a rival publisher’s ofﬁce is superior to that in the grantor ﬁrm
and that therefore the holder cannot equal the rival’s offer. The grantor
should not easily be entitled to rely on such unique, intangible advantages of
contracting with a third party to escape a contractual relationship with the
holder, when the contract with the third party remains of the type foreseen
in the preference contract and when it is not regarded as contrary to public
interest to enforce the holder’s right. Such non-tangible advantages of
contracting with a third party should rather be taken into account when the
court considers the legality of the right of ﬁrst refusal or exercises its
discretion on the choice between speciﬁc performance and damages.
On the other hand, the grantor should retain a large measure of freedom
to decide the terms on which he is prepared to contract. There are therefore
some situations where it is fair to preclude exercise of the holder’s right due
to her inability to match unique, personal terms, whereas in other instances a
strict duty-to-match approach seems unfair. The complexity in this area
requires more elaborate rules than the simplistic strict duty-to-match
approach of the South African cases. In this regard, South Africa can learn
from the American and German experience. Firstly, one should recognize
that unique terms may cause the contract not to be of the type covered by the
right of pre-emption. When a unique service undertaken by a third party
‘buyer’ in addition to payment of the purchase price is of the utmost
importance to the grantor, the contract could be classiﬁed as a type of
exchange or mixed contract rather than as a sale, and should therefore not
trigger a right of pre-emption. If the transaction nevertheless remains of the
type that would normally trigger the right of ﬁrst refusal, the point of
departure should be that the holder must match all its material terms, subject
to the following exceptions.
1. The unique term which the holder cannot match must be imposed in
good faith and must not be speciﬁcally designed to defeat the right of
ﬁrst refusal. To establish this, the grantor must supply a reasonable
justiﬁcation for a term which the holder cannot match. In the case of a
purely commercial transaction, such justiﬁcation must be based on
acceptable commercial standards.
2. Modiﬁcations of the terms should be allowed that are consistent with
the intention of the parties to the preference agreement (so that the
reasonable expectations of the holder are taken into account). Such
modiﬁcations would include modiﬁcations necessitated by the different
identities of the parties which do not prejudice the grantor.
3. Where a monetary value can be placed on the personal obligation
without prejudice to the grantor, the holder should be able to exercise
her right upon payment of such value. In this regard the grantor’s ipse
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dixit as to the value of the obligation should be accorded due weight
and if the stated price and the market value are close enough that there
is no reason to disbelieve her, that should be the price that the holder
should be allowed to match.
The principle that the holder need only match the material terms of the
third-party offer means that where the third-party contract would have been
concluded without a particular obligation, the holder can exercise her right
and ignore such obligation. An example of such a term would be an
undertaking by the third-party buyer to pay projection costs where he
himself instructed the company that undertook the forecast and the company
also had no connection with the grantor.140 The grantor clearly has no
interest in this term.
PACKAGE DEALS
Where the grantor purports to sell the pre-emption property as part of a
larger package, the question arises whether the holder should be entitled or
obliged to ‘step into the shoes of the third party’ by buying the entire
package, or whether she is only entitled or obliged to buy the pre-emption
property on its own.141 The package deal does not involve unique, personal
terms which the holder cannot match.As a result, speciﬁc rules are laid down
for it in the case law of the three legal systems under consideration.
South African law
Sher v Allen142 is the only South African decision that expressly considered
the effect of a package deal. The grantor sold the pre-emption property (a
portion of an erf) as part of a greater package (the whole erf). The court
decided that this transaction breached the right of pre-emption and awarded
damages to the holder, this being the only relief that was claimed. The
grantor argued that he did not ‘desire to sell’ the leased property, as foreseen
by the pre-emption provision, as he desired to sell the whole erf and not the
half-erf, so that the third party contract did not trigger the right of
pre-emption.143 The court rejected this argument on the basis that by selling
the whole erf the grantor must ‘ex necessitate rei’ be selling the half and must
be taken to have desired that which his act implied and involved.144 The
court indicated that the grantor could have sold the package, the erf, to a
third party, provided that he had respected his undertaking with the
holder.145 In this regard, three courses were open to him: ﬁrst, to ‘(if he
could) arrange to sell the whole erf’ to the holder; secondly, expressly to give
140 See text to note 130.
141 The meaning of the term ‘package deal’ and the questions raised by such transactions were set out in
the introduction to this article.
142 Supra note 118.
143 At 142.
144 At 143.
145 At 144.
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the holder ‘the preference call in respect of the leased property’ (the half-erf);
and thirdly, to sell in such a way as to have a speciﬁc offer in respect of the
leased property regarding which the holder might interpose his prefer-
ence.146 The court computed the damages on the basis of a higher outside
offer received for the package after the sale to the third party. As the other
half of the erf was situated on a corner, the court allocated additional value to
it and awarded the holder three-sevenths of £750, being the difference
between the price at which the grantor sold to the third party (£5250) and
the subsequent higher offer (£6000).
The decision implies that the grantor cannot insist on the holder buying
the entire package in order to exercise his right and to prevent the sale to the
third party. A rejected offer to the holder to buy the whole package at the
price offered by the third party would therefore not terminate the right of
pre-emption. This is clear from the court’s statement that the grantor would
fulﬁl his obligations under the pre-emption agreement if he arranged to sell
the whole property to the holder if he could, alternatively, if he offered the
pre-emption property to the holder on its own.
As the holder only sought damages, the decision leaves some questions
relating to package deals unanswered, but inferences can be drawn from the
court’s reasoning as to the rules which will probably apply where the holder
seeks enforcement of the pre-emption or main contract.
The court in Sher v Allen did not decide whether the holder would have a
right to enforce a sale of the entire package where the grantor did not follow
one of the three courses open to him. As the court held that one of the
courses open to the grantor before he sells to a third party is to offer the
pre-emption property on its own to the holder, the inference can be drawn,
however, that the court would not have enforced the sale of the whole
package to the holder against the wishes of the grantor.
The court also did not consider whether the holder would have the right
to enforce a sale of the pre-emption property on its own, as opposed to a
mere claim for damages. However, the same arguments in favour of the
enforceability of the main contract upon breach by the grantor147 apply here:
breach by the grantor in the form of an offer to or contract with a third party
should allow the holder to enforce a sale of the pre-emption property on its
own.
Whereas the court did not expressly consider the manner in which the
price of the pre-emption property alone should be calculated, the manner in
which it calculated damages provides an indication of the approach likely to
be followed by our courts. The implication of its award is that the holder
would be entitled to buy the pre-emption property on its own at a price
proportional to the total price agreed with the third party, taking into
account not only the size of the pre-emption property in relation to the
146 Ibid.
147 Set out in Naudé (2004) 121 SALJ op cit note 6.
WHICH TRANSACTIONS TRIGGER A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 485
package as a whole, but also special features of the properties which may
affect the value of a particular property compared to the others in the
package, such as its location in the case of land. The court did foresee the
possibility that the grantor and the third party could place a separate value on
the pre-emption property in the package deal, as this was mentioned as the
third course open to the grantor. However, the court did not deal with the
possibility of the holder alleging that this value is not a bona ﬁde price, but an
inﬂated value aimed at discouraging exercise of the right of pre-emption.
There is clearly a temptation to allocate an inﬂated portion of the package
price to the pre-emption property for this purpose.148
In addition, the court did not consider whether the holder would be
entitled to an interdict prohibiting the grantor from selling the pre-emption
property as part of a package until the grantor received a third-party offer in
respect of the pre-emption property alone, which the holder could match.
However, the court’s view on this issue appears from its statement that the
grantor may sell the entire package to a third party provided he has taken one
of the three courses open to him. He could therefore offer the pre-emption
property on its own to the holder and on rejection of that offer sell the entire
package to the holder. This implies that an interdict prohibiting the sale as
part of a package until a third-party offer for the individual property appears
will not be available. The holder would, however, be entitled to an interdict
prohibiting the grantor from selling the package to the third party until the
grantor takes one of the three courses open to him.
Although Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal149 did not expressly consider the
effect of the pre-emption property being sold as part of a greater package, the
decision lends implicit support to the approach in Sher v Allen. In Dithaba the
pre-emption property (certain mineral rights) was transferred to a subsidiary
of the grantor company together with all the grantor’s assets and liabilities in
South Africa against shares in the new subsidiary, but a separate book value
was placed on each of the assets transferred. The court held that the
pre-emption holder could buy the mineral rights at the book value placed
thereon. The effect of the mineral rights being sold as part of a package was
not argued before the court.
As Sher v Allen did not explicitly deal with all aspects of package deals it is
useful to consider the position in some other jurisdictions. I will accordingly
consider the position in the USA, where there is extensive case law and some
academic discussion of package deals, as well as the position in Germany,
where the Civil Code provides for package deals.
148 See also Rebecca Major ‘A practical look at pre-emption provisions in upstream oil and gas contracts’
(2005) 5 International Energy Law and Taxation Review 117 at 122.
149 Supra note 40.
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American law
There are four conﬂicting views in the US case law on the effect of the
package deal on the holder’s rights.150
First, the Supreme Court of Nevada has held that the package deal does
not breach the right of pre-emption at all, leaving the holder without any
remedy.151 This view depends on a literal interpretation of the pre-emption
agreement as being triggered by a desire to sell the pre-emption property
alone, where the package is regarded as something completely different from
the pre-emption property.152 Most courts and commentators rightly reject
this view.153 The court’s reasoning in Sher v Allen that an intention to sell the
package necessarily implies an intention to sell the portion burdened by the
right of pre-emption is persuasive.154 The Nevada Court’s literal interpreta-
tion would also permit grantors easily to render every right of ﬁrst refusal a
nullity by adding any additional property, even movable property of very
little value, to the pre-emption property and offering the package for sale.155
The second view encountered in the case law, often said to be the majority
view, is that a proposed package deal does not activate the holder’s right of
pre-emption, but the holder may obtain an injunction (interdict) to prohibit
the grantor from selling the pre-emption property as part of a package
deal.156 The grantor is therefore barred from selling the pre-emption
property until he receives an offer for the pre-emption property alone and
gives the holder a chance to match that offer.157 If the grantor has already sold
the combined properties when the holder comes to know of the sale, the
court will order that the properties be re-conveyed to the grantor.158
Accordingly, the package deal breaches the right of pre-emption but does
not trigger or activate it. The holder is therefore only entitled to remedies
enforcing the negative component of his right, the obligation not to contract
with a third party without ﬁrst granting the holder a right to contract on the
same terms. The advantage of this construction is that it recognizes that the
package deal violates the holder’s right, but simultaneously recognizes that
150 The Canadian case law is also disparate. See Flannigan op cit note 48 at 29–36.
151 Crow-Spieker #23 v Helms Constr and Dev Co, 731 P 2d 348, 350 (Nev 1987).
152 Bernard Daskal ‘Rights of ﬁrst refusal and the package deal’ (1995) 22 Fordham Urban Law Journal 461
at 474.
153 See all the other US cases cited below in this section; Daskal op cit note 152 at 474–5; Weldon B
Stutzman & David E Day ‘Protecting the preemptor: real property rights of ﬁrst refusal in light of Gyurkey v
Babler’ (1983) 19 Idaho LR 277. See also the Canadian writer Flannigan op cit note 48 at 29–32.
154 Supra note 144.
155 Daskal op cit note 152 at 474.
156 See, for example, Chapman v Mutual Life Ins Co of NY 800 P 2d 1147 (Wyo 1990) at 1152; Manella v
Brown 537 F Supp 1226 (D Mass 1982) at 1229; Gyurkey v Babler 651 P 2d 928 (Idaho 1982) at 934; Guaclides
v Kruse 170 A 2d 488 (NJ Super Ct App Div 1961) at 495; Atlantic Refining Co v Wyoming National Bank of
Wilkes-Barre 51 A 2d 719 (Pa 1947) at 725; New Atlantic Garden v Atlantic Garden Realty Corp 194 NYS 34
(NYApp Div 1922) at 40; Sawyer v Firestone 513 A 2d 36 (R I 1986) as well as the other cases cited by Tew
op cit note 25 at 7–70, Daskal op cit note 152 at 475 and Flannigan op cit note 48 at 34. Tew and Daskal are
of the opinion that this is the majority view, whereas Flannigan considers that there are in fact also roughly
as many US cases that recognize the right to enforce the right to buy the pre-emption property upon a
package deal (at 31).
157 Daskal op cit note 152 at 475.
158 See, for example, Wallach v Toll 113 A 2d 258 (Pa 1955) at 261; Daskal op cit note 152 at 475.
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the grantor’s intention to sell the package is not tantamount to an intention
to sell the pre-emption property.159 In addition, a right of pre-emption only
gives a preference to buy at a price acceptable to the grantor, and if the
pre-emption property is sold as part of a package, the price that is acceptable
to the grantor is unknown.160 It could be argued that if the court sets the
price, it unduly limits the grantor’s right to remain in control of the price
which he is willing to accept.161
The most important criticism against the total ban on package deals
entailed by this approach is that it unfairly deprives the grantor of a legitimate
means to market his property.162 It therefore turns the right of ﬁrst refusal
into an unjustiﬁably heavy restraint on alienation.163 It also conﬂicts with the
holder’s expectations: from her perspective a sale of the pre-emption
property as part of a package is no different from a sale of the property on its
own, so that she should be allowed to enforce the main contract upon breach
in the form of a package deal.164 The arguments which justify the availability
of a ‘positive remedy’ to enforce the main contract upon a sale of the
pre-emption property on its own to a third party apply in this context as
well.165 On the other hand, a holder who prefers such injunctive relief as is
available in the USAcannot expect to prevent a package deal more proﬁtable
to the grantor without being willing to purchase the pre-emption property at
a fair price.166 In response to the pricing problem, that is, the argument that it
is impossible to establish the price that the grantor would be willing to accept
for the pre-emption property alone, some courts have argued that the pricing
problem was created by the grantor, so that his failure to set a speciﬁc price
for the pre-emption property alone cannot stand in the way of positive
enforcement of the right of ﬁrst refusal.167 It is therefore fair that he be
restricted to the ‘fair value’ of the pre-emption property when the holder
exercises his right.168 It is therefore no wonder that most academic
commentators and many US courts reject injunctive relief in this form as a
suitable remedy.169
A third approach followed by a minority of US courts is that the holder’s
right to exercise his right of pre-emption embraces the whole package.170
This entails, on the one hand, that the holder is entitled to buy the entire
package, even against the wishes of the grantor. On the other hand, the
159 Daskal op cit note 152 at 477.
160 Daskal op cit note 152 at 477. See also Naudé 121 (2004) SALJ 636 (op cit note 6) at 647–8.
161 Daskal op cit note 152 at 477.
162 Stutzman & Day op cit note 153 at 292–3; Daskal op cit note 152 at 478; Capalongo v Giles 425 NYS
2d 225 (NY Sup Ct 1980) 228.
163 Ibid.
164 Daskal op cit note 152 at 479.
165 See Naudé (2004) 121 SALJ op cit note 6.
166 Stutzman & Day op cit note 153 at 293–4.
167 Flannigan op cit note 48 at 31–2 and cases there cited in notes 178–9.
168 Ibid.
169 Stutzman & Day op cit note 153 292–4; Daskal op cit note 152 at 479; Flannigan op cit note 48 at 36
and cases there cited.
170 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–71; Daskal op cit note 152 at 487–90 and cases there cited. See, for example,
Capalongo v Giles supra note 162 at 228.
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holder must be prepared to buy the entire package to prevent the transfer to
the third party. The principal argument in favour of this construction is that
the package deal is simply a term of the sale to the third party and the right of
pre-emption merely grants the right to buy on the same terms and conditions
as a third party, that is, a right to step into the shoes of the third party. In this
sense the package deal is no different from other unconventional terms
relating to the counter-performance required from the third party, and thus
the holder.171 South African cases have also required that the holder be able
to match the precise terms of the third party contract before she may exercise
the right of pre-emption.172 In addition, it is arguable that this construction
does not prejudice the grantor as he receives the same compensation
regardless of the identity of the buyer.173
However, the grantor may have non-economic, sentimental reasons for
being willing to sell the other properties in the package to the third party, but
not to the holder. In the American cases it is often the grantor who argues
against such relief.174 Moreover, the holder receives more than was foreseen
by him if he is entitled to buy the package.175 Requiring the holder to buy
the entire package in order to exercise his right may prejudice the holder
unfairly. It has also been said that the risk taken by the holder in respect of
unconventional terms relate to the counter-performance undertaken by the
third party and the method of payment, not to a collateral agreement with
respect to other properties which has nothing to do with the pre-emption
property.176
The fourth view, preferred by the writers, is that the holder has a right to
purchase the pre-emption property alone upon the conclusion of a package
deal with a third party.177 Correlatively, the grantor may conclude a package
deal with the third party after rejection of an offer to the holder to buy the
pre-emption property on its own.178 This position is preferred by writers as
they consider the condition of the property being sold or the grantor desiring
to sell the property to be fulﬁlled upon conclusion of a package deal.179 From
the holder’s point of view there is no difference between a sale of the
pre-emption property on its own or as part of a package.180 By accepting the
package deal the grantor himself causes the impossibility of ascertaining the
price which he would have accepted for the burdened property alone, so that
171 Daskal op cit note 152 at 489–90.
172 See Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra note 100 at 935B; Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter supra note 99,
discussed in more detail supra.
173 Daskal op cit note 152 at 489.
174 Daskal op cit note 152 at 491. See, for example Guaclides v Kruse supra note 156 at 493; Atlantic
Refining Co v Wyoming National Bank of Wilkes-Barre supra note 156 at 723; New Atlantic Garden v Atlantic
Garden Realty Corp supra note 156 at 39–40.
175 Daskal op cit note 152 at 490.
176 Ibid at 490–91.
177 Stutzman & Day op cit note 153 at 292–4; Daskal op cit note 152 at 497–501; Flannigan op cit note 48
at 36 and cases there cited. See also Wilber Lime Products Inc v Sonnentag Family Limited Partnership 673 NW
2d 339 (Wis App 2003).
178 Ibid.
179 Daskal op cit note 152 at 481.
180 Ibid at 483.
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the grantor should not be able to complain about losing control over the
price when the court ﬁxes it at a reasonable amount.181 The argument against
this relief — that it amounts to rewriting the contract if the court ﬁxes the
price — is therefore not convincing.182 There is some ambivalence in the
case law on the calculation of the price at which the holder may buy the
pre-emption property. Some courts ﬁx the price at the market value of the
pre-emption property183 and others at the pro rata price.184 One court has
referred to the price which the grantor would have allocated to the
pre-emption property, as determined by a court.185 This seems a fair test, as
the court could then take all the circumstances into account, including the
fair market value of the property on its own and the proportionate price in
relation to the package in light of not only the extent of the properties, but
other special features which may affect their value, the grantor’s reason for
packaging the properties and the effect of packaging the properties on the
pre-emption property’s value. If the grantor has allocated a price to the
pre-emption property on its own, the court should still be able to substitute
the price which it considers the grantor would actually have set on that
property alone, in order to prevent the grantor from ridding himself of the
holder through an inﬂated fake price allocation.186
It has also been held that the holder would be entitled to damages upon a
package deal with a third party, with no suggestion that this would be the
only relief available to the holder.187
The arguments in favour of the fourth construction mentioned above,
with damages as an alternative remedy, are persuasive. They are also not
inconsistent with Sher v Allen,188 the only South African case. It is preferable,
however, for the court to take a wider view of the calculation of the price. It
should seek to ascertain the price that the grantor would have accepted for
the pre-emption property on its own, taking into account its fair market
value, the effect of packaging on its value and any other relevant
circumstances.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid at 484.
183 See, for example, Pantry Pride Enterprises Inc v The Stop and Shop Co 806 F 2d 1227 (4th Cir 1986); Boyd
v Mahoney v Chevron USA 614 A 2d 1191 (1992); Wilber Lime Products Inc v Sonnentag Family Limited
Partnership supra note 177; Tew op cit note 25 at 7–73 at note 38; Daskal op cit note 152 at 482 note 114.
184 See, for example, Berry-Iverson Co of North Dakota Inc v Johnson 242 NW 2d 126 (ND 1976).
185 Brenner v Duncan 27 NW 2d 320 (Mich 1947) 322. Ultimately the court used the proportionate price,
regardless of the property’s independent market value, however.
186 In normal situations, where the grantor intends to sell the pre-emption property on its own, the
opportunity for such fraud is reduced if a default rule is accepted that the holder’s right only terminates
when the grantor actually contracts with and performs to a third party on terms that the holder had an
opportunity to match, within a reasonable time after submission of the third party offer to the holder. On
this proposed rule, see Naudé op cit note 5 at 358–360; Naudé (2004) 121 SALJ op cit note 6 at 648.
187 Anderson v Armour & Company 473 P 2d 84 (Kan 1970).
188 Supra note 142.
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German law
§ 467 BGB provides a residual rule for package deals (which may therefore
be varied by contrary agreement).189 It provides that if the third party had
bought the object of the right of pre-emption together with other objects or
properties for a total price (Gesamtpreis), the holder must pay a proportion-
ate part of the total price in order to exercise her right. However, the grantor
can require that the pre-emption apply to all the properties which cannot be
separated without prejudice to him. Obviously, in such a case, the holder
may decide not to exercise her right at all.190 The ﬁrst part of the provision
thus accords with the solution favoured by the American writers, whereas
the second part contains an important qualiﬁcation not yet considered in
South Africa or the USA.
The purpose of this qualiﬁcation is to ensure that economically integrated
properties should not be separated where this would prejudice the grantor.191
The likelihood that the third party would only be willing to pay less or
would retreat from the contract upon exercise of the right of pre-emption
does not in itself constitute ‘prejudice’, as the grantor of every right of
pre-emption must reckon with this possibility.192 If exercise of the right of
pre-emption in relation to the pre-emption property alone would impede
the sale of the rest of the property on terms as favourable as those agreed with
the third party, however, there is sufﬁcient prejudice to entitle the grantor to
insist that the holder exercise his right in respect of the package, if at all.193
There is some controversy over whether the grantor should be denied the
right to insist on a sale of the entire package under this qualiﬁcation, where
the economic unity of the properties already existed at the time when the
right of pre-emption was granted.194 The better view is that this should not
in itself bar the grantor from extending the pre-emption over the package.195
The holder cannot prevent the grantor from insisting on a sale of the entire
package by offering the grantor compensation for the prejudice suffered by
the grantor on division of the package.196
If the holder is entitled to purchase the pre-emption property alone, its
‘objective value’ must be ascertained, and in this regard the value at which
the property could have been sold on its own is decisive.197
189 Dieter Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1965) 342 argues that the BGB provisions
should be applied analogously to Vorhand agreements.
190 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 5.
191 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 1.
192 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 4.
193 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 4; Faust in Bamberger & Roth op
cit note 16 at § 467 Rn 4; RG HRR 1935 Nr 724.
194 Compare Putzo in Bassenge et al op cit note 16 at § 467 Rn 4 with Westermann in Krüger &
Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 5.
195 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 5.
196 Westermann in Krüger & Westermann op cit note 14 at § 467 Rn 1; OLG Stuttgart OLGR 1999, 1.
197 Faust in Bamberger & Roth op cit note 16 at § 467 Rn 3.
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Evaluation
For the reasons mentioned in the discussion of American law on this issue,
the holder should be entitled to exercise her right to buy the pre-emption
property on its own at a fair price, with the correlative that the grantor
should be entitled to conclude the package deal with the third party after
rejection of an offer to the holder to buy the pre-emption property on its
own at a fair price. This solution ﬁnds support in some American case law,
amongst most North American writers, and in German law. It is also not
inconsistent with the only South African case on package deals, Sher v
Allen.198 Allowing the holder to enforce the package deal as a whole against
the grantor’s wishes would be an unfair limitation on the free alienability of
the grantor’s other properties, in respect of which the holder has no right.
The question whether the holder’s right to buy the pre-emption property
alone should be qualiﬁed in the manner provided for in the German BGB is
more difﬁcult to resolve. This solution has not been considered in American
or South African law. The German solution aims to balance the opposing
interests of the parties to pre-emption agreements, which may vary
considerably depending on the circumstances. The holder may only be
interested in obtaining the pre-emption property on its own, or may be
interested in the total package, whereas the grantor may have reasons for
preferring the holder to purchase the pre-emption property on its own, or
may instead prefer that the holder should purchase the entire package if she
wishes to exercise her right. The BGB’s § 467 gives partial effect to each of
the parties’ possible interests and is therefore a via media: the holder may only
insist on purchasing the pre-emption property whereas the grantor may only
insist on the holder buying the package when he can prove that he will be
prejudiced by a sale of the pre-emption property on its own. This approach
may cause some uncertainty, due to the difﬁculty of deﬁning ‘prejudice to
the grantor’. It is also rather harsh towards a holder who is unable to afford
the package. The German solution should be rejected as it is the grantor
himself who, by granting the right of pre-emption, caused the problem of
not being able to market his properties as a package. Allowing the holder to
exercise her right over the pre-emption property alone may in any event
encourage the grantor and the third party to negotiate a fair solution with the
holder, which also caters for the grantor’s interest in selling the entire
package. For example, the grantor and third party may offer the holder a
share in the ownership of the combined properties proportionate to the
value of the pre-emption property, should she refrain from exercising her
right to buy the pre-emption property on its own, or they may agree that the
holder will continue to enjoy a right of pre-emption over the pre-emption
property after the sale to the third party. The grantor could in this manner
attain his purpose with the package deal to some extent whilst at the same
time respecting the holder’s interest to exercise control over the destiny of
198 Supra note 144.
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the pre-emption property. Although the equities are not entirely clear, on
balance the qualiﬁcation that the grantor may sometimes require the holder
to buy the entire package if she wishes to exercise her right should not be
adopted by South African law.
SALE OF A PORTION OF OR PARTIAL INTEREST IN PRE-
EMPTION PROPERTY
A proposed sale of only a portion of the pre-emption property, that is, a sale
of less than the grantor’s entire interest in the property (including a sale of an
undivided share therein), may also cause some difﬁculties. The holder may
have little use for anything less than the entire property, and may not be
interested in buying only a portion.199 On the other hand, non-exercise of
her right at that stage may ultimately result in the grantor selling the entire
pre-emption property to the third party in increments, in which case the
holder would wish to retain her preferential right.200 Must the holder buy
the portion in order to retain her right of pre-emption? In other words, does
the failure of the holder to exercise her right when a portion is proposed to
be sold to a third party deprive the holder of the right to buy the property
when it later appears that the whole property was eventually sold? May the
holder obtain an interdict prohibiting a partial sale by the grantor?
South African law
McGregor v Jordaan201 considered a sale of a portion of the pre-emption
property to a third party who knew of the right of pre-emption. The holder
sought, and was granted, an order declaring the contract with the third party
null and void and an interdict prohibiting the holder from giving and the
third party from receiving transfer of any portion of the farm. The holder also
claimed damages, but none was awarded by the court, which gave no reasons
for this decision.
Although the facts of Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox202 are
not entirely clear, it appears that the grantor of the right of pre-emption
granted a perpetual lease over a portion of the pre-emption property to a
third party. The court ordered that the third party contract be cancelled as
the third party had prior knowledge of the right of pre-emption.
As the holders in these decisions only sought cancellation of the transfers
to mala ﬁde third parties, neither of these decisions provides answers to all
the questions raised by sales of a portion of the pre-emption property. It is,
however, clear that the sale of a portion of the pre-emption property is
regarded as a breach of the right of pre-emption, and that the holder is
entitled to an interdict prohibiting such a sale or an order cancelling the
199 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–74.
200 Ibid.
201 1921 CPD 301. See also McGregor v Jordaan 1920 CPD 209.
202 1891 4 SAR 116.
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transfer of the pre-emption property to a third party with prior knowledge of
the right of pre-emption. These decisions, read with later decisions which
grant the holder the right to enforce the main contract upon breach, are
likely to persuade a court that the holder has a right to purchase the partial
interest in the pre-emption property at the terms agreed with or offered to
the third party.
American and Canadian law
A majority of courts in the USA have decided that the grantor’s willingness
to sell a partial interest in the pre-emption property gives the holder the right
to buy that partial interest by matching the third party’s offer.203 A Canadian
court has also held that the sale of a portion of the pre-emption property (one
of three parcels of land), triggers the right of pre-emption to buy that
portion.204 The alternative would allow the grantor unfairly to defeat the
right of pre-emption by piecemeal alienation.205
In Lawrence v Peel206 an Oregon court held that the holder cannot force the
grantor to sell the pre-emption property all at once upon the grantor
proposing to sell a portion of the land in question to a third party. This is a
sensible rule: the opposite view would entail too serious a restraint on the
grantor’s freedom to alienate his property as he wishes.
The question whether a long-term lease as a partial interest in land triggers
a right of pre-emption has been discussed above.207
There is some authority that a holder’s failure to exercise the right of
pre-emption when offered a partial interest in the pre-emption property
does not amount to a waiver of the holder’s right, so that she may exercise
her right to buy the remainder of the property when it is sold to a third
party.208
German law
The German BGB provisions on Vorkaufsrechte are silent on the effect of
the sale of a partial interest in the pre-emption property. However, there is
authority that the sale of a portion of the pre-emption property triggers the
right of pre-emption to buy that portion.209
Evaluation
The case law from the USA is implicitly consistent with (although more
detailed than) the two South African cases on sales of partial interests in the
203 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–75 and cases there cited.
204 Pushka v Magnowski Estate 26 Man R 2d 89 (Man CA 1984).
205 Flannigan op cit note 48 at 22.
206 607 P 2d 1386 (Ore Int App Ct 1980).
207 See the text to notes 95 and 96. See also Tew op cit note 25 at 7–76
208 Tew op cit note 25 at 7–76–7-77; cf Meyer v Warner 448 P 2d 394 (Ariz 1968).
209 BGH WM 1984, 511; Henrich op cit note 189 at 341–2; Grunewald op cit note 64 at 146.
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pre-emption property and should be followed. German law also points to the
same approach.
Suppose the holder did not exercise her right of pre-emption to buy a
portion of the pre-emption property as she was only interested in the
property as a whole. If she could thereafter prove that the grantor
subsequently sold the entire property in a series of transactions to the same
third party in a deliberate attempt to get rid of the holder, she should be
entitled to buy the entire property on the terms agreed with the third party,
due allowance being made for inﬂation, and should not be held to have
waived her right when she refused to buy the ﬁrst portion.
CONCLUSION
The South African case law on the transactions which trigger a right of ﬁrst
refusal leaves much to be desired. Uncertainty is caused by conﬂicting
decisions on a number of points and the absence of clear authority on others.
Furthermore, a comparison with American and German law reveals that
some of the South African decisions offer overly simplistic solutions which
lead to unfair results in some situations. Drafters of preference agreements or
preference clauses in wills must therefore seriously consider the cost-
effectiveness of initiating negotiations on the areas of uncertainty and of
drafting accordingly. Because of the typically cryptic wording of preference
agreements, the need for fair residual rules remains.
First, involuntary sales should not trigger a right of pre-emption in the
absence of agreement to the contrary, despite some case law which suggests
otherwise. However, the legislation should preferably indicate in the
Companies Act that the right of pre-emption of limited interest (private)
company shareholders applies to involuntary sales as well in the manner
foreseen by Van den Berg v Transkei Devopment Corporation.210 In addition,
some non-arm’s length ‘sales’ to related parties which have been held to
trigger rights of pre-emption, such as sales within the same group of
companies which involve no change in control of the grantor company, and
which are aimed solely at a company restructuring, should probably not be
trigger events. However, the right of pre-emption should continue to bind
the new owner as before. Where the grantor uses corporate vehicles to
transfer the pre-emption property to a third party by means of a so-called
‘step transaction’, the holder should, however, be able to exercise her right.
The strict duty-to-match approach which some South African cases adopt
in respect of unique, personal terms undertaken by the third party is too
simplistic to provide a fair solution in all cases. A combination of exceptions
to the duty to match encountered in German and American law provides a
more complex, but fairer solution.
Although the only relevant South African case did not consider all aspects
of package deals, the court’s point of departure in that case is sound. The
210 Supra note 21.
WHICH TRANSACTIONS TRIGGER A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 495
same applies to the early cases on sales of a portion of the pre-emption
property. If the grantor used a series of transactions in which portions of the
pre-emption property were sold to a third party to defeat the holder’s right,
the latter should be allowed to exercise her right, due allowance being made
for inﬂation, and should not be held to have waived her right when she failed
to buy the ﬁrst portion.
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